We analyze undiscounted continuous-time games of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits. The risky arm generates payoffs according to a Lévy process with an unknown average payoff per unit of time which nature draws from an arbitrary finite set. Observing all actions and realized payoffs, players use Markov strategies with the common posterior belief about the unknown parameter as the state variable. We show that the unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium can be computed in a simple closed form involving only the payoff of the safe arm, the expected current payoff of the risky arm, and the expected full-information payoff, given the current belief. In particular, the equilibrium does not depend on the precise specification of the payoff-generating processes.
Introduction
We analyze a class of continuous-time two-armed bandit models in which a number of players act non-cooperatively, trying to learn an unknown state of the world that governs the risky arm's expected payoff per unit of time. Actual payoffs are given by Lévy processes, that is, processes with independent and stationary increments. In addition, players receive free background information in the form of a process of the same type as the payoff processes. Rather than discounting future payoffs, players evaluate their payoff streams according to the strong long-run average criterion.
1 Assuming that all actions and payoffs are public information, we restrict players to Markov strategies with the common posterior belief about the unknown parameter as the natural state variable, and we look for Markov perfect equilibria.
This setting allows us to handle a much larger class of priors and payoff-generating processes than the existing literature on bandit-based multi-agent learning in continuous time. First, the unknown state of the world can be drawn from an arbitrary finite set, whereas the literature assumes a binary state. Second, the payoff processes can combine continuous with discrete increments, whereas the literature assumes either Brownian or Poisson payoffs. Third, lump-sum payoffs can be good or bad news, whereas the literature assumes that news is of one type only.
The broadening of the class of payoff-generating processes, and the generalization from Bernoulli to arbitrary discrete priors in particular, is not entirely without costs, however. In the Brownian model of Harris (1999, 2000) and the Poisson models of Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) and Rady (2010, 2015) , beliefs evolve on the unit interval, which allows for a space of admissible Markov strategies large enough to accommodate the discontinuities of actions with respect to beliefs which are an immutable feature of asymmetric equilibria. For these settings, the results of Bolton and Harris (2000) yield a characterization of the entire set of undiscounted Markov perfect equilibria. In general, however, one must invoke results on the existence and uniqueness of solutions to stochastic differential equations that rely on Lipschitz continuity of coefficients. This rules out asymmetric equilibria but, as our main result shows, the space of Lipschitz continuous strategies is large enough to ensure existence of a unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium.
The equilibrium strategy has a simple explicit form, moreover. As already noted in Bolton and Harris (2000) , the absence of discounting and the presence of background information imply that a player's best response can be computed without knowledge of the player's value function. In fact, given the current belief, a player's optimal action depends only on the intensity of experimentation performed by the other players, the payoff of the safe arm, the expected current payoff of the risky arm, and the expected full-information payoff -it does not depend on the precise specification of the payoff-generating process. This feature carries over to the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium, where one and the same functional form -the natural generalization of that in Bolton and Harris (2000) -applies across all specifications that we consider. The common equilibrium action is a piecewise linear function of the ratio of two differences: that between the risky arm's expected full-information payoff and the safe payoff, and that between the safe payoff and the risky arm's expected current payoff.
We show that this result extends to two specifications of priors and payoff-generating processes in which the unknown state of the world is drawn from a continuous distribution of unbounded support: Brownian payoffs with normal priors as in Jovanovic (1979) , and Poisson payoffs with gamma priors as in Moscarini and Squintani (2010) . In either specification, the players' information is captured by a two-dimensional sufficient statistic, which can serve as the state variable for Markov strategies.
Our result hinges on four features of the setting that we study: (i) players receive free background information; (ii) they use the strong long-run average criterion; (iii) the experimentation game is played in continuous time; and (iv) the players' risky payoff processes and the background information are all of the same (unknown) type, hence perfect substitutes with respect to learning. The background information ensures that players learn the true state eventually, no matter what strategy profile they use. This makes it possible to evaluate players' random payoff streams according to the strong long-run average criterion, that is, by computing the expected accumulated shortfall of received payoffs relative to the expected full-information payoff. Under this criterion, the problem of finding a best response to the opponents' Markovian strategy profile has a recursive structure amenable to dynamic-programming techniques. In continuous time, this leads to an HJB equation in which the value function enters only through the expected rate of change of continuation payoffs. When the players' risky payoff processes and the background information are all of the same type, moreover, the rate of change of expected continuation values is linear in the total intensity of experimentation. This makes it possible to eliminate a player's value function completely from the maximization problem in the HJB equation, so best responses can be determined without reference to the value function and the payoff-generating processes.
Each of these four features is indeed crucial. Without background information, the strong long-run average criterion would be ill-defined because the expected accumulated shortfall of received payoffs relative to the expected full-information payoff would always grow infinitely large. With discounting, the HJB equation would necessarily contain a term 'discount rate times current value' that is not multiplied by the total intensity of experimentation, so best responses would depend on current values. As pointed out in Dutta (1991) , moreover, alternative undiscounted performance criteria would not permit a recursive representation. If the model were set in discrete time, the expected rate of change of continuation payoffs would not be linear in the total intensity of experimentation. In a discrete-time version of an exponential bandit gameà la Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) , for example, the probability of a success in any given round is clearly non-linear in the number of players pulling the risky arm. Linearity would also fail if the type of the risky arm were independent or imperfectly correlated across players, or if the law of the payoff process differed across players.
2
While the computation of best responses does not involve the specifics of the payoffgenerating processes, the evolution of the players' posterior beliefs obviously does depend on how the payoffs are generated, as do the players' equilibrium payoffs. To characterize the latter, and to verify that a certain profile of Markov strategies constitutes an equilibrium, one has to solve a functional equation that involves the infinitesimal generator of the belief process. Our approach here is to show that the player's value function is the unique viscosity solution of the HJB equation subject to the relevant boundary conditions, and that the payoff function for the suggested strategy profile also solves this boundary-value problem, so the two must agree and the player indeed plays a best response.
3
Besides Bolton and Harris (2000) , the undiscounted limit of a continuous-time stochastic game with one-dimensional state space has also been studied in Harris (1988 Harris ( , 1993 and Välimäki (1997, 2002) , yielding a much simpler characterization of equilibria than under discounting. More recent applications of this methodology to single-agent experimentation problems can be found in Bonatti (2011) and Peitz, Rady and Trepper (2017) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the game and states our assumptions on priors, payoff-generating processes and strategy spaces. Section 3 presents the infinitesimal generator of the process of posterior beliefs. Section 4 constructs the unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium. Section 5 presents extensions of our analysis to two settings with a continuously distributed state of world. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Linearity would also fail in a restless bandit model in which the state of the world changed exogenously over time. This would be the case, for example, if payoffs were generated by a Brownian motion with an unknown drift subject to Markovian state-switching between a high and a low level as in Rady (1999, 2003) .
3 For a recent application of this approach to the verification of optimality in a single-agent learning context with Brownian signals, see Ke and Villas-Boas (2019) .
The Experimentation Game
Time t ∈ [0, ∞[ is continuous. There are N ≥ 1 players, each of them endowed with one unit of a perfectly divisible resource per unit of time. Each player faces a two-armed bandit problem where she continually has to decide what fraction of the available resource to allocate to each arm. One arm is safe, the other risky.
The safe arm generates a known constant payoff s > 0 per unit of time. The evolution of the payoffs generated by the risky arm depends on a state of the world, ℓ, which nature draws from the set {0, 1, . . . , L} with L ≥ 1 according to the positive probabilities π 0 , . . . , π L . Players do not observe the state, but know its distribution. They also know that the payoff process associated with player n's risky arm is of the form
where Z n is a standard Wiener process and Y n is a compound Poisson process whose Lévy measure ν is finite and has a finite second moment h 2 ν(dh). 4 The drift rate ρ, the diffusion coefficient σ > 0 and the Lévy measure ν are the same for all players. While σ is the same in all states of the world, moreover, ρ and ν vary with the state. 5 Conditionally on ℓ, the processes
We write ρ ℓ and ν ℓ for the drift rate and Lévy measure in state ℓ, λ ℓ = ν ℓ (R\{0}) for the expected number of jumps per unit of time, and h ℓ = R\{0} h ν ℓ (dh) / λ ℓ for the expected jump size. The state-contingent expected risky payoff per unit of time is µ ℓ = ρ ℓ + λ ℓ h ℓ . We assume that µ 0 < µ 1 < . . . < µ L−1 < µ L with µ 0 < s < µ L , so that neither arm dominates the other in terms of expected payoffs. Writing π for the vector of probabilities (π 1 , . . . , π L ), we let m(π) denote the expected current (or myopic) payoff from the risky arm, and f (π) a player's expected full-information payoff:
Let k n,t ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of the available resource that player n allocates to the risky arm at time t; this fraction is required to be measurable with respect to the information that the player possesses at time t. The player's cumulative payoff up to 4 Here, ν(B) < ∞ is the expected number of jumps per unit of time whose size is in the Borel set B ⊆ R\{0}. The finite second moment ensures that the processes X n have finite mean and finite quadratic variation. 5 Our assumptions on the diffusion coefficient and the Lévy measures ensure that the players cannot infer the true state instantaneously from the continuous and jump part of risky payoffs, respectively. 6 Given our convention to treat π 1 , . . . , π L as the independent variables, π 0 should be viewed as
time T is then given by the time-changed process [T − τ n (T )] s + X highlighting the potential for the posterior belief to serve as a state variable.
From now on, we restrict players to strategies that are Markovian with respect to this variable, so that the action k n,t chosen at time t is a deterministic function of the posterior π t only. More precisely, we take the players' common strategy space K to be the set of all Lipschitz continuous functions from the L-dimensional simplex
to [0, 1] . By standard existence and uniqueness results for solutions of stochastic differential equations, any strategy profile (κ 1 , . . . , κ N ) ∈ K N gives rise to a well-defined process of posterior beliefs, 8 and hence to well-defined payoffs
A player's payoff will indeed be −∞ for certain Markov strategies. If the player always uses the safe arm, for example, and the true state ℓ is such that µ ℓ > s, then by almost sure convergence of posterior beliefs to the truth, the above integrand will converge to s − µ ℓ < 0 as t grows large, implying a diverging integral in that state. Since this occurs with positive prior probability, the expected payoff is −∞, therefore.
We call a strategy in κ n ∈ K reasonable if each degenerate belief has a neighbourhood in which the strategy prescribes the action that is optimal in the respective state; in particular, [1 − κ n (π)]s + κ n (π)m(π) = max{s, m(π)} in all these neighbourhoods, and [1 − κ n (π)]s + κ n (π)m(π) − f (π) = 0 in all vertices of the simplex ∆ L . Establishing that posterior beliefs converge exponentially fast to the truth, we show in the appendix that the expected payoff from a reasonable strategy is always finite and, in fact, bounded on the simplex.
8 For L = 1 and no discontinuous payoff component, i.e. in the setting analyzed in Bolton and Harris (2000) , the presence of background information allows one to invoke a result of Engelbert and Schmidt (1984) whereby any profile of Borel measurable Markov strategies implies a unique solution for the belief dynamics; see also Section 5.5 of Karatzas and Shreve (1988) . For L = 1, no Brownian payoff component, and lump-sum payoffs that are always good news (meaning that ν 0 (B) ≤ ν 1 (B) for all Borel sets B ⊆ R\ {0}), one can proceed as in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) and Keller and Rady (2010) and take K to be the set of functions which are left-continuous and piecewise Lipschitz continuous; as beliefs drift down deterministically in between lump-sums, these properties allow one to construct belief dynamics in a pathwise fashion. Neither approach generalizes to higher dimensions.
player must obtain a finite payoff in any MPE.
The Infinitesimal Generator
The evolution of posterior beliefs is driven by up to N + 1 distinct sources of information: the observations on up to N risky arms plus the background signal. Suppose that only player 1 uses the risky arm, and at full intensity. In other words, consider the timeinvariant action profile for which k 1 = 1 whereas k n = 0 for all n > 1. Write G for the infinitesimal generator of the corresponding belief process -as the payoff-generating process is the same on every player's risky arm, the identity of the player in question does indeed not matter here.
If we now change player 1's time-invariant intensity to k 1 < 1 while keeping all other intensities at zero, the resulting deceleration of the process of observations implies the scaled-down generator k 1 G for the posterior belief; see Dynkin (1965) , for example. The same applies to the background signal, of course, if it alone is observed, with associated generator k 0 G.
As the processes X 0 and X 1 are independent conditionally on the realized state, Trotter (1959) implies that the infinitesimal generator of posterior beliefs is (k 0 + k 1 )G when both the background signal and player 1's payoffs are observed. By the same token, successively adding the other players with time-invariant allocations k 2 , . . . , k N leads to the infinitesimal generator (k 0 + K)G where K = N n=1 k n measures how much of the N available units of the resource is allocated to risky arms overall. This fact will play a crucial role in our analysis.
The generator G is that of a jump diffusion. In the interior • ∆ L of the simplex, its action on a C 2 function u is given by
and
is the revised probability of state ℓ after a lump-sum payoff of size h arrives. The first term captures the learning from the continuous part of the payoff-generating process; the second term, the discrete belief revision upon the arrival of a lump-sum payoff; and the third term, the gradual belief revision when no such lump-sum arrives.
For L = 1, and hence π = π 1 , we obtain the generator computed by Cohen and Solan (2013) , with the first term simplifying to
the expression familiar from Harris (1999, 2000) . It reflects the fact, established in Liptser and Shiryayev (1977, Theorem 9.1) , that when there is no discontinuous payoff component (λ 0 = λ 1 = 0), then the posterior belief π t of a single agent who allocates his entire resource to the risky arm follows a diffusion process with zero drift and diffusion coefficient (
For L > 1, a generalization of Liptser and Shiryayev (1977, Theorem 9 .1) shows that, from the agent's perspective, the corresponding belief process π t is a driftless L-dimensional diffusion with instantaneous variance-covariance matrix given by
hence the structure of the first term in Gu.
10
The second and third terms generalize their counterparts in Cohen and Solan (2013) to L > 1 in the obvious way. In the special case that L = 1 and the size of lump-sum payoffs is uninformative (meaning that conditional on the arrival of a lump-sum, the distribution of its size does not depend on ℓ), these terms reduce to
as in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) and Keller and Rady (2010) .
Note that we have not imposed any mutual absolute continuity assumptions on the measures ν 0 , . . . , ν L . As a consequence, lump-sum payoffs of a certain size may rule out certain states, so that the posterior belief jumps to a subsimplex of ∆ L of dimension lower than L. Once this happens, Bayesian updating ensures that beliefs remain in this subsimplex.
Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Suppose that all players except player n use the strategy κ † ∈ K, and write (κ n , κ † ¬n ) for the strategy profile that results when player n uses the strategy κ n ∈ K.
When choosing κ n , player n faces a problem of optimal stochastic control of a jump diffusion, and κ n is a best response if and only if the payoff function u n (·|κ n , κ † ¬n ) is the value function for that control problem. This means in particular that a necessary condition for κ n to be a best response is that the payoff function u n (·|κ n , κ † ¬n ) be a viscosity solution of the HJB equation Øksendal and Sulem (2007) or Pham (2009), for example.
11 Conversely, the following conditions are sufficient for κ n to be a best
is a viscosity solution of the HJB equation in
• ∆ L and satisfies the appropriate boundary condition on ∂∆ L ; (ii) there exists only one such solution.
As the left-hand side of (1) is zero (a consequence of no discounting) and k 0 + (N − 1)κ † (π) + k is positive (because of the background signal), the HJB equation can be rearranged as 0 = max
which demonstrates that the set of maximizers does not depend on continuation values. Straightforward algebra allows us to further simplify the problem by rewriting the HJB equation so that k appears only in the denominator:
Following Bolton and Harris (2000), we define the incentive to experiment by
when m(π) < s, and ∞ otherwise. When I(π) < k 0 + (N − 1)κ † (π), the numerator in (2) is positive and the maximum is achieved by k = 0; when I(π) > k 0 + (N − 1)κ † (π), the numerator is negative and the maximum is achieved by k = 1; when I(π) = k 0 + (N − 1)κ † (π), the numerator is zero and the choice of k is inconsequential.
There are three different ways, therefore, in which k = κ † (π) can achieve the maximum in the HJB equation: either κ † (π) = 0 and
. This pins down κ † (π) in terms of the incentive to experiment, I(π), the strength of the background signal, k 0 , and the number of players, N:
As the partial derivatives of the incentive to experiment I are clearly bounded on the compact set {π ∈ ∆ L : k 0 ≤ I(π) ≤ k 0 + N − 1}, the function κ † is Lipschitz continuous and hence an element of K. Like the functions m and f , moreover, I and κ † are non-decreasing in π. Finally, it is straightforward to check that κ † prescribes the full-information optimal action in a neighbourhood of each vertex of ∆ L , so the strategy is reasonable.
Proposition. All players using the strategy κ † constitutes the unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium of the experimentation game.
Proof: That this strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium is shown in the appendix. Uniqueness follows from the arguments that led us from the HJB equation (1) to the representation (3) for candidate equilibrium actions. Note that by equation (3), the set of beliefs for which κ † (π) = 0 is independent of the number of players and actually the same as for a single agent experimenting in isolation. This is a stark manifestation of the incentive to free-ride on information generated by others. In the terminology coined by Bolton and Harris (1999) , it means that there is no 'encouragement effect': the prospect of subsequent experimentation by other players provides a player no incentive to increase the current intensity of experimentation and thereby shorten the time at which the information generated by the other players arrives. Intuitively, this simply reflects our assumption that players do not discount future payoffs and hence are indifferent as to their timing. Formally, the absence of the encouragement effect is a consequence of the linearity of the infinitesimal generator of posterior beliefs in k 0 + K: as the value of future experimentation by other players is captured by a player's equilibrium continuation values, yet best responses are independent of those continuation values, there is no channel for future experimentation by others to impact current actions. we set π 1 = π 2 and let that common belief range from 0 to 0.5: so it is a slice through the simplex from the 0-vertex to the midpoint of the opposite edge. (In this figure, the parameters are as in Figure 1 except that N varies from 2 for the leftmost curve to 10 for the rightmost curve.)
The dependence of the overall intensity of experimentation on the number of players is less clear cut: roughly speaking, Nκ † increases in N at beliefs where κ † requires exclusive use of the risky arm, but decreases at beliefs where both arms are used simultaneously.
As to the dynamics of beliefs in equilibrium, the present framework permits the analysis of experimentation games in which large payoff increments are bad news.
12 For example, let L = 1 for simplicity, with ρ 0 = ρ 1 and λ 0 = λ 1 . Assume that the payoff increments are in the set {s − 10, s − 5, s + 5, s + 10}. For the 'good' arm, the associated probabilities of a lump-sum of that size are {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.1}, so the expected increment is s + 1; for the 'bad' arm, the associated probabilities of a lump-sum of that size are {0.5, 0.1, 0.1, 0.3}, and the expected increment is s − 2. When a payoff increment occurs, the belief jumps -up if the increment is moderate (s − 5 and s + 5 are relatively more likely if the arm is 'good'), and down if the increment is extreme (s − 10 and s + 10 are relatively more likely if the arm is 'bad'). So, in this stripped-down illustration, an arrival of the largest possible payoff increment is bad news, and may well cause the players to stop experimenting.
Finally, by the martingale convergence theorem, beliefs converge almost surely to the degenerate distribution concentrated on the true value of µ; therefore f (π) converges to either s or the true µ, and so κ † (π) converges to either 0 or 1. As was already said in Section 2, we show in the appendix that the convergence of beliefs is exponentially fast in expectation; this immediately implies that equilibrium actions converge exponentially fast as well.
Continuous State Spaces and Sufficient Statistics
This section presents two specifications of priors and payoff-generating processes that fall outside the framework of Section 2 but still permit the same analysis as in Sections 3 and 4. In both settings, the unknown state of the world is drawn from a continuous distribution of unbounded support, with conjugate priors ensuring that the players' information is captured by a two-dimensional sufficient statistic, which can serve as the state variable for Markov strategies. 13 Models in which agents have beliefs and observe stochastic processes like those in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 can be found in Jovanovic (1979) and Moscarini and Squintani (2010) , respectively.
12 In Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) and Rady (2010, 2015) lump-sum sizes are completely uninformative, while in Cohen and Solan (2013) lump-sums are informative, but always good news. 13 The unbounded state space requires adjustments to the proof (via uniqueness of viscosity solutions to the HJB equation) that every player using the strategy κ † constitutes an MPE of the game; we omit the details here.
Brownian Payoffs, Normal Prior
Suppose that the payoff-generating processes and the background signal are of the form
where the Z n are independent standard Wiener processes and nature draws the unknown drift µ from a normal distribution with mean m 0 and precision τ 0 > 0. This is also the players' common prior. Given the Gaussian process they observe, players then believe at time t that µ is distributed according to a normal distribution with some mean m t and precision τ t > 0; see DeGroot (1970, Chapter 9) , for example. The pair π t = (m t , τ t ) constitutes a sufficient statistic for the updating of beliefs, therefore. Given a generic π = (m, τ ) ∈ R × ]0, ∞[ , the corresponding probability density function for µ is g(µ; π) = τ 1/2 φ (µ − m)τ 1/2 , where φ denotes the standard normal density. Let G(·; π) denote the associated cumulative distribution function.
As in Section 3, consider a single player allocating his entire resource to the risky arm. Following Chernoff (1968, Lemma 4 .1) or Liptser and Shiryayev (1977, Theorem 10 .1), τ t increases deterministically at the rate σ −2 and m t is a driftless diffusion process with
relative to the player's information filtration.
14 As a result, we see that
for any function of class C 2,1 . By the same arguments as in Section 3, moreover, the generator associated with time-invariant intensities (
Since the precision τ t increases over time, the relevant state space is the half-plane Π = R × [τ 0 , ∞[ . As to admissible strategies, we take K to be the set of all functions κ : Π → [0, 1] such that κτ −1 is Lipschitz continuous on Π. Given a strategy profile (κ 1 , . . . , κ N ) ∈ K N , the sum K = N n=1 κ n also lies in K, and the system we need to solve is
The change of variable η = ln τ transforms this into dm = K(m, e η ) e −η σ −1 dZ and dη =
this system has a unique solution, as was to be shown.
We can now replicate the arguments of Section 4 in the present setting. As a first step, we compute the expected current payoff m(π), the expected full-information payoff 14 More precisely, it can be shown that dm t = σ −1 τ −1 t dZ t and dτ t = σ −2 dt where, now, the innovation
Note that the expression equivalent to that for dm t to be found in equation (9) of Jovanovic (1979) 
f (π), and the incentive to experiment I(π). The expected current payoff m(π) is simply the projection of π on its first component. For the expected full-information payoff, we have
where z = (s − m)τ 1/2 and Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. To see this, note first that f (π) = sG(s; π) + ∞ s µ g(µ; π) dµ. We trivially obtain G(s; π) =
2 τ , moreover, we have dg(µ; π) = −(µ − m)τ g(µ; π) dµ and so µ g(µ; π) dµ = m g(µ; π) dµ
The above representation makes it straightforward to verify that f is strictly increasing in m and strictly decreasing in τ .
15 This implies that I and κ † as defined in (3) are nondecreasing in m and non-increasing in τ .
When m < s, we have
In the appendix, we verify that κ † ∈ K by showing that Iτ −1 is Lipschitz continuous on the set {π ∈ Π : k 0 ≤ I(π) ≤ k 0 + N − 1}. This is more involved than in scenarios with a discrete prior because the set in question is unbounded. Figure 4 illustrates equilibrium actions as a function of the posterior mean m and variance τ −1 . (In this figure, s = 6 and N = 4.) As in Figures 1-2 , the solid curves are the boundaries of the sets of beliefs at which the equilibrium requires full experimentation or no experimentation, and the dashed lines are level curves for κ † equal to 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8. All these curves are downward sloping; as one would expect, there is a trade-off between mean and variance with the latter capturing the 'option value' of experimentation. In particular, a very high variance is needed to induce a high intensity of experimentation at low means. As the mean approaches the safe flow payoff, the level curves become steeper and steeper so that the posterior variance has a diminishing impact on the intensity with which the players explore the risky arm.
15 Alternatively, since max{s, µ} is increasing in µ, a first-order stochastic dominance argument can be used to establish that ∂f (π)/∂m > 0, and since max{s, µ} is convex in µ, a second-order stochastic dominance argument can be used to establish that ∂f (π)/∂τ < 0. 
Poisson Payoffs, Gamma Prior
Let s > 0 for the safe arm. Suppose that the payoff-generating processes and the background signal are independent Poisson processes whose unknown common intensity µ is drawn from a gamma distribution with parameters α 0 > 0 and β 0 > 0. This is also the players' common prior. Given the processes they observe, players then believe at time t that µ is distributed according to a gamma distribution with some parameters α t > 0 and β t > 0, which together constitute a sufficient statistic again; see DeGroot (1970, Chapter 9), for example. Given a generic π = (α, β) ∈ ]0, ∞[ 2 , the probability density function for µ is g(µ; π) = [β α /Γ(α)]µ α−1 e −βµ ; the mean and variance of µ are α/β and α/β 2 , respectively. We again write G(·; π) for the corresponding cumulative distribution function.
Once more, consider a single player allocating his entire resource to the risky arm. He expects to obtain a positive increment between t and t + dt with probability (α t /β t ) dt, in which case Bayes' rule implies that π t jumps to (α t + 1, β t ); with probability 1 − (α t /β t ) dt, there is no such increment and dπ t = (dα t , dβ t ) = (0, dt). Thus, α counts arrivals of increments and β measures the time that has elapsed -again, see DeGroot (1970, Chapter 9) . As a consequence, we have
Once more, the generator associated with time-invariant intensities (
Given that α t and β t increase over time, and α t can only do so in unit increments, the relevant state space is Π = {α 0 + j : j = 0, 1, 2, . . .} × [β 0 , ∞[ . For K, we choose the set of all functions κ : Π → [0, 1] such that κ(α 0 +j, ·) is right-continuous and piecewise Lipschitz continuous for all j. Starting from any π ∈ Π, any strategy profile (κ 1 , . . . , κ N ) ∈ K N induces a well-defined and unique law of motion for π t , As the unknown intensity µ is also the risky arm's average payoff per unit of time, we see that the expected current payoff is m(π) = α/β. The expected full-information payoff is
with the second term obtained as follows:
The formula for f makes it straightforward to verify that, exactly like m, this function is strictly increasing in α and strictly decreasing in β.
16 Consequently, the incentive to experiment I and the strategy κ † as defined in (3) are non-decreasing in α and nonincreasing in β.
For m(π) < s, we have
In the appendix, we verify that κ † ∈ K by showing for any fixed α that I(α, ·) has a bounded first derivative when m(π) < s. Figure 5 illustrates the mean-variance trade-off in equilibrium actions for Poisson payoffs and gamma prior. (Here, as in the example with Brownian payoffs and normal prior, s = 6 and N = 4; the curves shown are thus the exact counterparts of those in Figure 4. ) To compute the level curves, one uses the fact that the shape parameter α equals the squared mean of the gamma distribution divided by its variance, and β is α divided by the mean. The similarity to Figure 4 is striking; a closer comparison reveals that the level curves in the Brownian-normal case are somewhat steeper than those in the Poisson-gamma case. This is because in the former, an increase in the variance induces a mean-preserving spread for the random variable α on the whole real axis, whereas in 16 Alternatively, for α ′ > α ′′ the likelihood ratio g(α; α ′ , β)/g(α; α ′′ , β) is increasing, and for β ′ > β ′′ the likelihood ratio g(α; α, β ′ )/g(α; α, β ′′ ) is decreasing. Since the likelihood-ratio ordering implies first-order stochastic dominance, f has the stated monotonicity properties.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium actions for Poisson payoffs and gamma prior the latter, the mean-preserving spread is concentrated on the positive half-axis and thus raises the option value of experimentation by more.
Concluding Remarks
We have seen that when rewards from the risky arm are generated by IID Lévy processes with an unknown average payoff per unit of time, the players' strategy in a symmetric MPE of the undiscounted experimentation game depends only -and in a very simple functional form -on the safe payoff, the expected current payoff of the risky arm, and the expected full-information payoff. Given a finite set from which nature draws the unknown average payoff, the equilibrium strategy is then independent of the actual specification of the payoff-generating processes.
As to the settings with a continuous prior, recall that in the Brownian-normal case the precision of the posterior distribution increases unboundedly with time, as does the inverse of the variance in the Poisson-gamma case. Consequently, the posterior probability density function becomes concentrated on a narrow domain of the support. If we approximated the normal or gamma distribution with a discrete distribution then, over time, the beliefs would become more and more concentrated on the discrete values closest to the true parameter -this suggests that we could take the 'engineering' approach and focus on discrete distributions, with the specification of the payoff-generating processes being irrelevant. Letting the discount rate go to zero is going to make the analysis easier in many dynamic settings, but it remains unclear, in general, whether the simplification will be as great as in the present case. Candidates for optimal strategies or best responses may be easier to identify in the undiscounted limit, but there remains the need to obtain a welldefined law of motion, which may again require restrictions such as Lipschitz continuity and could even lead to existence problems. Nevertheless, we believe that the strong longrun average criterion has the potential to prove useful in other contexts, especially since strategies which are optimal under this criterion will shed light on (at least approximately) optimal behaviour for small positive discount rates.
Boundedness of Payoffs from Reasonable Strategies
We present the case L = 1 only, so that ℓ ∈ {0, 1}, π = π 1 ∈ [0, 1], µ 0 < s < µ 1 , m(π) = (1 − π)µ 0 + πµ 1 and f (π) = (1 − π)s + πµ 1 . Suppose first that the Lévy measures ν 0 and ν 1 are non-trivial and equivalent.
For the description of the evolution of beliefs, it is convenient to work with the log odds ratio
so that π t = e ωt 1 + e ωt and 1 − π t = e −ωt 1 + e −ωt .
Lemma A.1 There exists a constant C > 0 such that for all x, y ∈ R, e x+y 1 + e x+y ≤ e x 1 + e x + e x (1 + e x ) 2 y + C e x (1 + e x ) 3 y 2 .
Proof: For f (x, y) = e x+y 1 + e x+y , we compute the partial derivatives f y (x, y) = e x+y (1 + e x+y ) 2 , f yy (x, y) = e x+y (1 − e x+y )
(1 + e x+y ) 3 .
For fixed x, the function f (x, ·) thus has the following second-order Taylor approximation around y 0 = 0:
f (x, y) ≈ e x 1 + e x + e x (1 + e x ) 2 y + 1 2 e x (1 − e x ) (1 + e x ) 3 y 2 .
As 1 − e x ≤ 1, we have the local (with respect to the second variable) upper bound
Replacing the factor 1 2 in the last term by a sufficiently large constant C ensures a global upper bound. 18 Suppose now that starting from π 0 = π (and corresponding ω 0 = ω), the players use the strategy profile (κ 1 , . . . , κ N ) ∈ K N . By an extension of the results in Cohen and Solan (2013, Section 3 .2) to more than one agent, the log odds ratio at time t > 0 can be written as
18 Numerical computations suggest that C = 2 is large enough.
where
is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of ν 1 with respect to ν 0 , and M ℓ is a martingale under the probability measure P ℓ associated with state ℓ. The expectation and variance of M ℓ under this measure, moreover, satisfy E ℓ [M ℓ t ] = 0 and Var ℓ [M ℓ t ] ≤ C ℓ t for all t and a positive constant C ℓ . 19 As ln x < x − 1 for all positive x = 1, and
unless ν 1 = ν 0 , in which case the inequality µ 1 > µ 0 implies ρ 1 > ρ 0 . So η 0 < 0 < η 1 . As κ n ≥ 0 for all n, this in turn implies
By Lemma A.1,
Writing C ′ ℓ = CC ℓ , we thus have
Now let player n use a reasonable strategy. Then there is a constant C 2 > 0 such that
for all π. Note that max{s, m(π)} − f (π) is bounded below by s − f (π) = π (s − µ 1 ) and by
Given the prior belief π 0 = π, the player uses the expectation operator E π = (1 − π)E 0 + πE 1 to compute her objective function. Thus,
This is the desired result. Next, suppose that the Lévy measure ν 1 , say, is not absolutely continuous with respect to ν 0 . Take a ν 0 -null set B ⊆ R\{0} with ν 1 (B) > 0. In state ℓ = 1, we then have P 1 [π t = 1] ≥ 1 − e −ν 1 (B)t , so that
This exponential convergence again allows us to compute an upper bound for
Finally, if both Lévy measures are trivial, the inequality η 0 < 0 < η 1 holds trivially, and the result follows as above. 
Viscosity Solutions of the HJB Equation
We are interested in solutions u : Ω → R of boundary value problems of the form
where Du and D 2 u are the gradient and the Hessian matrix of u, respectively, M is an operator mapping C(Ω) into itself, and v ∈ C(Ω). A function u ∈ C(Ω) is called a viscosity subsolution of (A.1) if for every φ ∈ C 2 (Ω) and every x 0 ∈ Ω such that φ ≥ u on Ω and φ(x 0 ) = u(x 0 ),
Analogously, a function u ∈ C(Ω) is called a viscosity supersolution of (A.1) if for every φ ∈ 20 Note that the variables X and Y just introduced are unrelated to the objects for which we use these symbols in the main text.
C 2 (Ω) and every x 0 ∈ Ω such that φ ≤ u on Ω and φ(x 0 ) = u(x 0 ),
Finally, u ∈ C(Ω) is called a viscosity solution of (A.1) if it is a viscosity sub-and supersolution of (A.1).
The HJB equation (1) and its reformulation (2) are both of the form (A.1) with Ω =
• ∆ L , the operator in question being
By the arguments that led us from (1) to (2) in Section 4, these equations have the same viscosity solutions. We will refer to either equation as the HJB equation in what follows. Suppose that all players except player n use the strategy κ † defined in (3). Let u * (·|κ † ¬n ) denote the value function of the control problem that player n faces when choosing a best response, and u(·|κ † , κ † ¬n ) the player's payoff function when she also uses strategy κ † , that is,
. We shall establish the converse inequality via a comparison result for viscosity sub-and supersolutions.
We know that both functions are bounded. Assume for now that they are actually continuous on ∆ L ; we will justify this assumption later.
Lemma A.2 The value function u * (·|κ † ¬n ) is a viscosity subsolution of the HJB equation.
Proof: We simplify the notation by writing u instead of u * (·|κ † ¬n ).
To establish that u is a viscosity subsolution of (1), we must show that
Suppose that this is not the case, so that
and note that ψ → φ uniformly as ε → 0. For δ > 0, let B δ (π 0 ) ⊂ R L be the open ball of radius δ centered at π 0 . By continuity, we can find ε, δ > 0 such that
for all k ∈ [0, 1] and all π ∈ B δ (π 0 ). As π 0 is a strict maximizer of u − ψ, moreover, there exists
. Suppose now that player n uses the strategy κ ∈ K against the other players' common strategy κ † . Define τ = inf{t > 0 :
where the equality in the third line follows from Dynkin's formula. But this contradicts the dynamic programming principle, which states that for all (x, r, p, X, d) ∈ Ω × R × R L × S L × R, all positive semidefinite Y ∈ S N and all q ≥ 0. This means that F corresponds to −H here. 21 As a consequence, the inequalities defining sub-and supersolutions in terms of F are the opposite of those in terms of H.
There is a second, more substantive difference between the definitions of Ishii and Yamada (1993) and ours. Translated back into our setting, a function u ∈ C(Ω) is a viscosity subsolution of (A.1) in their sense if for every φ ∈ C 2 (Ω) and every x 0 ∈ Ω such that φ − u has a local minimum in x 0 , H(x 0 , Dφ(x 0 ), D 2 φ(x 0 ), u(x 0 ) − M u(x 0 )) ≥ 0.
Analogously, a function u ∈ C(Ω) is a viscosity supersolution of (A.1) in their sense if for every φ ∈ C 2 (Ω) and every x 0 ∈ Ω such that φ − u has a local maximum at x 0 ,
In these alternative definitions, therefore, u is replaced by φ only as far as the gradient and Hessian are concerned, but not in the nonlocal term. When M is an integral operator of the type considered here, however, an argument in Alvarez and Tourin (1996, p. 300) implies that these definitions are in fact equivalent to ours. 22
Lemma A.4 Let a function v ∈ C(∂∆ L ) be given. Suppose that u is a viscosity subsolution of the HJB equation, u a viscosity supersolution, and u ≤ v ≤ u on ∂∆ L . Then u ≤ u on ∆ L .
Proof: Equation (2) takes the form assumed in Ishii and Yamada (1993) with the domain Ω =
• ∆ L , the function
. . . 21 Note that Ishii and Yamada (1993) allow the value of the solution to enter as a separate variable besides its difference with the nonlocal operator. Because of the absence of discounting, this generality is not needed here, so H has one argument fewer. 22 See Azimzadeh, Bayraktar and Labahn (2017) for a related discussion. and the operator M u(x) = 1 λ(x) R\{0} u(j(x, h)) ν(x)(dh).
It is straightforward to check that F , M and the function B(x, u) = u− v(x) defined on ∂∆ L × R satisfy all the conditions imposed by Ishii and Yamada (1993) . The result thus follows from their Theorem 3.1.
Corollary A.1 u * (·|κ † ¬n ) = u(·|κ † , κ † ¬n ).
Proof: The proof is by induction over the dimension of the faces of the simplex. The 0-faces (vertices) correspond to degenerate beliefs that assign probability 1 to one of the states; at all these vertices, both functions assume the value 0. An application of Lemma A.4 for L = 1 now yields u * (·|κ † ¬n ) = u(·|κ † , κ † ¬n ) along any 1-face (edge) of the simplex. Applying the lemma for L = 2 then proves this identity for all 2-faces (facets), and so on until the entire simplex is covered.
As a by-product, this confirms that the value function is indeed the unique viscosity solution of the HJB equation.
It remains to justify our assumption that the functions u * (·|κ † ¬n ) and u(·|κ † , κ † ¬n ) are continuous. In fact, using upper semicontinuous and lower semicontinuous envelopes, Ishii and Yamada (1993) define the notion of viscosity sub-and supersolution for functions that are merely locally bounded. Lemmas A.2 and A.3 still hold then, and Lemma A.4 generalizes in a way that ensures that any viscosity solution satisfying a continuous boundary condition must be continuous overall; see Ishii and Yamada (1993, Corollary 3.3) . Continuity of the functions in question follows from an iterative application of this result as in the proof of Corollary A.1.
Verification that κ † ∈ K for Brownian Payoffs and Normal Prior To verify that κ † ∈ K, it suffices to show that Iτ −1 is Lipschitz continuous on Π(a, b) = {π ∈ Π : a ≤ I(π) ≤ b} for any positive real numbers a < b. For I(π) = c, we have ∂(Iτ −1 )/∂m = −F ′ (F −1 (c)) τ −1/2 and ∂(Iτ −1 )/∂τ = 1 2 F ′ (F −1 (c))F −1 (c) − c τ −2 . This establishes that both partial derivatives of Iτ −1 are bounded along any level curve I(π) = c in Π. Letting c range from a to b shows that they are bounded on the whole of Π(a, b), so Iτ −1 is indeed Lipschitz continuous there.
